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IN THE UTAH COURT OF APPEALS

STATE OF UTAH,
Plaintiff - Respondent,
vs.

Case No. 900456-CA

RONALD R. KOURY,

Category No. 2

Defendant - Appellant.
STATEMENT OF JURISDICTION
As it relates to this Reply Brief of Defendant - Appellant, the
jurisdiction of the Utah Court of Appeals is the same as that set forth
in Defendant - Appellant's original brief.
STATEMENT OF ISSUES ON APPEAL
I.

Did the District Court err in denying Defendant's Motion to

Suppress, based upon the unlawful search and seizure violative of the
protections provided by the Fourth and Fourteenth Amendments and Article
I, Section 14 of the Utah State Constitution?
II.

Did the District Court err in failing to find an agency

relationship, where law enforcement officials had knowledge of and
acquiesced to an informants entry into and search of a person's home?
III. Did

the

District

Court

err

in

failing

to

extend

the

protections of the Fourth and Fourteenth Amendments and Article I,
Section 14 of the Utah State Constitution, against unlawful searches and
seizures, carried out vicariously by law enforcement officials?

STATEMENT OF THE CASE AND STATEMENT OF THE FACTS
The Statement of the Case and Statement of the Facts applicable to
this Reply Brief were sufficiently set out in the original brief of
Appellant Ronald Koury. Appellant Koury would, however, point out that
Appellee, the State of Utah, stated in its Statement of Facts that
Horvath and Cordner never spoke again after an investigation was begun.
The State cites to the record at 183-184.

Horvath stated at lines 12

and 13 at 184 that after the investigation began "Dennis would not speak
to me as a friend or otherwise."

However, the Record at 196-197

demonstrates that Horvath changed his story on cross-examination.

He

there stated that he did in fact have daily contact with Cordner.
SUMMARY OF ARGUMENT
In its Brief, the State of Utah asserts that Defendant - Appellant
Ronald Koury is raising an issue on appeal that was not raised in the
trial court.

The State has obviously misunderstood or misconstrued

Kouryfs Brief. This appeal deals with the failure of the District Court
to recognize an agency relationship between Horvath and local law
enforcement officials.

The issue of Horvath's agency was definitely

raised at the level of the trial court.
arguments to that end were made by Koury.

Numerous references and

If an agency relationship is

found, then all subsequent evidence must be suppressed based upon the
"fruit of the poisonous tree" doctrine.

The suppression itself is not

the entire basis of this appeal, the issue of agency is crucial to the
issue of suppression and as such was raised in the trial court.
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ARGUMENT
This appeal deals with the necessity of suppression of evidence
obtained by law enforcement officials as a result of certain illegal
searches and seizures, carried out by an agent of law enforcement and
law enforcement officials.
I.
THIS APPEAL DEAL8 WITH THE AGENCY
STATUS OF THE INFORMANT HORVATH WHICH WAS
IN FACT RAISED AT THE TRIAL LEVEL
The State seeks to "cubby-hole" this appeal to the evidence seized
by Horvath, when in fact the appeal deals with the overall agency status
of Horvath.

If the trial court erred as herein alleged by Koury, and

Horvath is considered an agent, all evidence obtained from any and all
searches conducted by Horvath as well as law enforcement as a result of
Horvath's illegal and unauthorized involvement must be suppressed, not
just the evidence gathered by Horvath.

Thus, at this point, it is

irrelevant whether the state seeks to introduce the evidence gathered
by Horvath. The central theme of this appeal is to determine the agency
status of Horvath.

If Horvath is found to be an agent, then and only

then does the issue of suppression of evidence come before the court.
There is ample support on the record for Koury's assertions that
Horvathfs agency status was in fact challenged in the trial court.

A

review of Koury's Memorandum in Support of Motion to Suppress (R. at 90
through 96) will reveal that this agency status and search and seizure
related thereto was in fact raised in the Motion to Suppress.

In

further support of Kouryfs claim that Horvathfs agency and illegal
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search and seizure was in fact raised at the trial level is the
following language used by Koury in his Memorandum in Support:
Horvath, as an agent of the police, was prohibited
from entering Defendant Kouryfs house without a
warrant. Horvath entered Defendant's house several
times after contacting the police with information
regarding drug trafficking and distribution, and
evidence obtained through Horvath after April 4,
1989 should be suppressed.
(R. at 94 and 95
emphasis added).
The foregoing demonstrates that Koury attempted to show that Horvath was
an agent.

It demonstrates that Koury attempted to suppress all even

obtained as a result of Horvathfs mere involvement, based upon his
illegal searches and seizures as an agent of law enforcement.
II. HORVATH*8 8TATD8 AS AN AGENT OF LAW
ENFORCEMENT TAINTS ALL EVIDENCE RECOVERED
AS A RESULT OF HIS ILLEGAL SEARCHES AND
SEIZURES PURSUANT TO THE FRUIT OF THE
POISONOUS TREE DOCTRINE
An endless number of cases have dealt with the fruit of the
poisonous tree cases. By way of illustration, United States v. Vauahan,
718 F.2d 332 (9th Cir. Cal. 1983), held that if a warrant is invalid
because the affidavit in support of the warrant relied significantly on
illegally seized evidence (or on illegal searches in the instant case),
it follows that any evidence seized pursuant to it must also be
suppressed.

This case demonstrates the doctrine of the fruit of the

poisonous tree.

As it relates to the instant case, Horvath1s illegal

and unauthorized searches and seizures taint not only the substances he
removed from the Koury home, but all evidence obtained, including that
sought to be introduced by the State, as a result of information from
4

Horvath's illegal searches and seizures.
Additionally, Lucas v. State, 704 P.2d 1141 (Okla. 1985), held that
a gun and certain drug paraphernalia, seized from the defendant's
residence, even though obtained pursuant to a valid search warrant, was
discovered by the exploitation of an illegal search and was fruit of the
poisonous tree and as such it must be suppressed.

This is the same

basic doctrine with a slight factual change. The point is that not only
is the evidence which Horvath personally seized subject to suppression,
but so is the evidence seized by law enforcement as a result of
Horvath's illegal involvement.

CONCLUSION
Accordingly, the State's argument that the issue on appeal is not
properly before the Court is erroneously based and should be so
recognized.

The issue on appeal of Horvath's agency status and the

subsequent issue of the suppression of evidence related to Horvath's
actions were in fact properly raised at the trial court level. Horvath
was an agent of law enforcement as evidenced by his continued entrance
into the home of an alleged would-be assailant and his "daily" contact
with law enforcement in that regard.
Respectfully submitted this

day of April, 1991.

WAYNE B. WATSON, P.C.
Attorney for Appellant
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CERTIFICATE OF DELIVERY
I hereby certify that four true and correct copies of the foregoing
Reply Brief for Appellant, with postage prepaid thereon, were mailed to
the office of R. Paul Van Dam, Utah Attorney General and Charlene
Barlow, Assistant Attorney General, Attorneys for Appellee, 236 State
Capitol, Salt Lake City, Utah 84114, this

? ' day of April, 1991.

WAYtfE B. WATSON, P.C.
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ADDENDUM

U.S. CONST, amend. IV.
[Unreasonable searches and seizures]
The right of the people to be secure in their persons, houses,
papers, and effects, against unreasonable searches and seizures,
shall not be violated, and no Warrants shall issue, but upon
probable cause, supported by Oath or affirmation, and particularly
describing the place to be searched, and the persons or things to
be seized.

UTAH CONST, art. I, §14.
[Unreasonable searches forbidden —

Issuance of warrant]

The right of the people to be secure in their persons, houses,
papers and effects against unreasonable searches and seizures shall
not be violated; and no warrant shall issue but upon probable cause
supported by oath or affirmation, particularly describing the place
to be searched, and the person or thing to be seized.

WAYNE B. WATSON, P.C. -» 3405
DANA D. BURROWS - 5045
WATSON, SCRIBNER & BURROWS
Attorneys for Defendant
2 69 6 N. University Avenue
Suite '220
Provo, UT 84604
Telephone: (801) 375-5600
IN THE FOURTH JUDICIAL DISTRICT COURT
UTAH COUNTY, STATE OF UTAH
STATE OF UTAH,
Plaintiff,

MEMORANDUM OF POINTS AND
AUTHORITIES IN SUPPORT OF
MOTION TO SUPPRESS

vs.
RONALD R. KOURY,

Defendant.

Civil No.

891400352

(Judge Christensen)

COMES NOW Defendant, by and through counsel of record, and pursuant
to Rule 4-501 of the Utah Code of Judicial Administration hereby submits
the Point and Authorities in Support of the Motion to Suppress as
follows:

MATERIAL FACTS
1.

On or about April 4, 1989, informant Joseph Horvath spoke with

officers Dennis Kordner and Gary L. Caldwell regarding threats he had
been receiving from Defendant, Ron Koury.

At this time, he also

mentioned the Defendant's name in connection with distributing illegal
narcotics.
2.

In Officer Caldwell's Probable Cause Affidavit, he states that

Officer Kordner and Horvath were in daily contact since April 4, 1989,
concerning this case.

on Koury's telephone ntunber as a result of the information given to him
by Horvath to keep track of all phone calls made to or from the house,
in order to keep track of Koury's whereabouts.
4.

On May 1, 1989, Horvath went to Koury's house to check the

windows and feed the animals.

In one bedroom, he observed what he

thought to be residue from a line of cocaine, and in another room in the
house, he observed what he thought to be cocaine paraphernalia. Horvath
went to the police with this information.
5.

Horvath entered Koury's house at least two more times between

May 1 and May 8, 1989.

The warrant to search Koury's residence was

issued on May 8, 1989.

ARGUMENT
I.

Mr. Horvath was acting as an agent of the police.

Black's Law Dictionary, Fifth Edition, defines "agent" as follows:
One who represents and acts for another under the contract or
relation or agency.
One who undertakes to transact some
business, or to manage some affair, for another, by the
authority and on account of the latter, and to render an
account of it.
Mr. Horvath told the police, specifically Officer Caldwell and
Officer Kordner, on April 4, 1989, that the Defendant was trafficking
and distributing cocaine.

Mr. Horvath had accurately informed police

in the past and was considered, by Caldwell, to be a reliable informant.
The police were in constant contact with Mr. Horvath concerning the
whereabouts and activities of the Defendant from April 4, 1989, until
the date the search warrant was issued.
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Mr. Horvath was acting under

the authority of the police in keeping track of Defendant and looking
through the rooms in Defendant's house.

If this were not the situation,

why then would the police and Mr. Horvath be in daily contact?

Police

knew that Defendant had asked Horvat.h to keep an eye on his house while
he was out of town, and took advantage of this to get Horvath to search
through

the

house

for

evidence

of

the

alleged

trafficking

and

distribution.
On May 1, 1989, while Mr. Horvath was supposedly looking through
Defendant's house to check the windows, Horvath observed cocaine residue
and paraphernalia and told the police what he had seen.

Horvath also

entered the house at least two more times after May 1, 1989, to "check
the windows and feed Defendant's pets."

The police knew that Horvath

had access to Defendant's house and, therefore, used Horvath, as an
agent, to do an illegal search in order to obtain probable cause for a
legal search warrant.
II.

An informants information must be considered reliable and
apprised of the underlying facts and circumstances which show
probable cause.

The Court in Aauilar v. Texas, 378 U.S. 108 (1964), established a
two-pronged standard in obtaining a search warrant:
1.

The standard of reasonableness for obtaining a search warrant
is the same under the Fourth and Fourteenth Amendments.

2.

Although an affidavit supporting a search warrant may be based
on hearsay information and need not reflect the direct
personal observations of the affiant, the magistrate must be
informed of some of the underlying circumstances relied on by
the person providing the information and some of the
underlying circumstances from which the affiant concluded that
the informant, whose identity was not disclosed, was
creditable or his information reliable.
3

Horvath first informed the police of the alleged wrongdoings of the
Defendant on April 4, 1989, In a Preliminary Hearing, held on September
13, 1989, Horvath told the Court that he and Koury were close friends
and were partners in a body shop business from June, 1987, to December,
19 88,

Horvath stated that he and the Defendant had several arguments.

Horvath also stated that Defendant Koury "threatened mine and my wife
and kids1 life, I was concerned that he was going to inflict bodily harm
on myself and my family . . . this guy is a mental case." United States
v. Harris, 403 U.S. 573 (1971), states:
Recent case law has acknowledged that a different rationale
exists for establishing the reliability of named citizen
informers as opposed to unnamed police informer, who are
frequently criminals. Those in the latter category often
proffer information in exchange for some concession, payment,
or simply out of revenge against the subject; under such
circumstances, it is proper to demand some evidence of their
credibility or reliability.
Horvath had some personal interest in Defendant's arrest, as he had been
allegedly threatened many times and was worried for his and his family's
lives.

In their affidavit, the police testified that Horvath was a

reliable informant. United States v. Harris, 403 U.S. 574 (1971) states
that:
reliability of the informant was not necessary, since the
inquiry as to probable cause was whether the informer's
present information was truthful or reliable.
In light of Horvath's relationship to Defendant, thoughts of his own
safety and gain may have influenced his information to be unreliable and
given him motive to enter Koury's house to aid the police in their
investigation.

Horvath's motive being to help the police catch Koury
4

before Koury carried oat any of his threats.
In addition, the fact that Horvath was an unnamed police informant,
with possible ulterior motives, his information should be held to the
higher level of scrutiny of United States v. Harris.
III. An acting agent of the police is the equivalent of an employee
of the police, which -rculd require the agent to obtain a
search warrant before entering a suspect's house.
In Pavton v. N.Y. , 445 U.S. 573 (1980), the Court held that the
Fourth Amendment prohibits the police from entering a suspect's home
without a warrant to make a rourine arrest.
these searches

and seizures

The Court reasoned that

inside a home without

a warrant are

presumptively unreasonable, when the purpose is to search or seize an
object or a person.

Amendment IV of the Constitution of the United

States states:
The right of the people to be secure in their persons, houses,
papers, and effects, against unreasonable searches and seizures,
shall not be violated, and no Warrants shall issue, but upon
probable cause, supported by Oath or affirmation, and particularly
describing the place to be searched, and the persons or things to
be seized.
This right is applicable to the states through the Fourteenth Amendment.
United States v. Espinosa, 782 F.2d 888, 890 (10th Cir. 1986)
states that:
The Fourth Amendment does not protect against all searches and
seizures, but rather against those which are unreasonable...
the protections of the Fourth Amendment, however, apply only
to governmental action; a search or seizure, even if
unreasonable, performed by a private person not acting as a
government agent or in concert with a government official is
not within the scope of the Fourth Amendment.
Horvath, as an agent of the police, was prohibited
5

from entering

Defendant Koury's house without a warrant. Horvath entered Defendant's
house

several

times after contacting

the police with

information

regarding drug trafficking and distribution, and evidence obtained
through Horvath after April 4, 1989 should be suppressed.

Horvath

continued entering the home and making observations on behalf of the
police, thus demonstrating an agency relationship.

Based upon the

knowledge the police had of the relationship between Hoirvath and the
Defendant, they took advantage of the situation by having Horvath
conduct searches they could not legally conduct themselves-

Such a

relationship must be considered one of agency due to the severe results
upon Fourth Amendment protections were the Court to rule otherwise.
Horvath claims to be in fear for his own life and the lives of his
wife and children, but asks the Court to believe that he continued to
enter the house and feed the animals of his friend.

It seems somewhat

illogical to continue with such activities, when one is in fear for
one's life.

As an agent, Mr. Horvath would be able to implicate

defendant in an action such as the present if he were to continue to
provide information and surveillance to the police, which is exactly
what he did.
When the totality of the circumstances are analyzed, it is obvious
that Horvath was an informant, he was acting at police suggestion,
motivation, request, or the like. He informed police and continued to
do so up to the time of arrest.

It is a smear upon Fourth Amendment

protections to allow the police to carry on an investigation through an
informal agency relationship, obtaining evidence and subsequent warrant
6

and arrest, illegally.

CONCLUSION
The police are prohibited by the Fourth Amendment from searching
a personfs home without a warrant-

Horvath, as an agent of the police,

is considered an extension of that body, and is bound by the same laws
and limitations as the police.

Horvath searched Defendant's house

without a search warrant, under the supervision of the police, in
violation of the Defendant's Fourth Amendment rights.

Therefore, the

evidence found during any such searches, should be suppressed, as it was
obtained in violation of Defendant's rights. To allow the police to act
in such a manner as it violates the state and federal constitutions,
would be a grave injustice.
DATED this

^^

day of June, 1990.

WAYNSfV. WATSON, P.C.
At-t£opney for Defendant
HAND DELIVERY CERTIFICATE
I hereby certify that I hand delivered a true and correct copy of
the foregoing, to the following on the "XX- day of June, 1990:
Sherry Ragan
Deputy Utah County Attorney
100 East Center, Suite 2100
Provo, Utah 84606
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A

Okay.

So Officer Cordner was asking you some ques-

tions about him?
A

No, no.

Q

Okay.

Did you later give him more information with

regard to Mr. Koury?
A

Yes.

Q

When did that occur?

A

I donft know the exact date.

Q

Okay, would you say your conversations escalated

then, you talked to him more and more about Mr. Koury?

i

A

!

Yes.

i

Q

Okay.

And what type of information were you giving

him then?
A

Well, Mr. Koury had stated to me that he would

implicate me in any and all matters regarding drugs or any
other illegal activity that he would be engaged in, that I
was acting as his partner.

And so I became worried.

Q

When, do you recall when that occurred?

A

On a number of occasions.

Q

And did you tell Officer Cordner about that?

A

Yes.

Q

Do you remember when?

A

I don't.

I mean it's, you know, it's a repeated

thing.
Q

Okay.

What else did you tell Officer Cordner?

13

/$?

A

What else did I tell him?

Q

Urn-hum (yes), about Mr. Koury.

A

Specifically?

Help me, I donft know what you are,

what?
Q

How often did you talk to Officer Cordner about Mr.

Koury just prior to the May 8th date when he was arrested?
A

How often did I?

Not hardly at all.

Q

Okay, do you recall what kind of things you were

telling him?
A

Once they started an investigation, I did not speak

to him at all.
Caldwell.

At that time I had to speak with Gary

Dennis would not talk to me as a friend or other-

wise .
Q

Okay.

And when did that happen?

A

I don't know the exact day.

Q

All right.

And what kind of things did you tell

Officer Caldwell?
A

Oh, just, just different things, periods of time

that Ron had been gone, and call up ranting and raving, and
not taking his kids to school, and stuff like that.
Q

Okay.

Why were you giving him that information?

A

Why?

Q

Did you know that they were doing an investigation?

A

Yes, ma'am, I did.

Q

Okay.

Because I had fear for my life.

And what was your understanding of what was

u /r/

A

I don't recall.

Q

Give me your best estimate.

A

Oh, maybe eight or ten times.

Q

And how many times do you think that you talked

I have no idea.

to Officer Cordner between 4 April and 8 May?
A

I have no idea.

Q

Give me your best estimate.

A

Well, between 4th April and May, I did Detective

Cordner's police car, which was involved in an accident, and
his car was in my shop.
to check on the vehicle.

So Detective Cordner would come by
So I would, during that period of

time, I would have had cause to talk to him almost daily
while I was working on his police vehicle.
Q

And you talked about Koury, right?

That wouldn't

be the purpose of your conversation, but almost daily for
that 34-day period you talked about Koury?
A

No.

It was kind of a joke, and he's still gone,

I mean, it was not, he is present in the shop had become so
un-often that it was a joke, when we seen him there working
it was a special day.
Q
back.
A

Well, C^ _ner was anxious to know when he came
Right?
Not really.

I didnft have any idea when Koury was

coming back.
Q

Now do you recall testifying on direct examination
26

some ten minutes ago that you never talked to Cordner from
4 April until 8 May, cause Detective -A

Not in regards to Koury.

Q

Let me finish my question.

A

Okay.

Q

Do you recall testifying a moment ago on direct

examination that between 4 April, when you first told them
about the cocaine and took some to the police, and 8 May,
that you never talked to Detective Cordner after that?
A

Yes.

Q

It was all conversation with -- Caldwell?

A

Well, except for doing his car, you know.

I mean,

now that we have been sitting here recalling this period of
time, it comes to light in my mind that during that period
of time I fixed Detective Cordner's car.
Q

Okay, so would you like to change your testimony

with regard to the conversations that you had before?
A

Yes.

I would say that I would change my testimony,

because while I was fixing Dennis1 car I did have occasion
to talk to him regularly; however, not about the Koury case,
it was about his car.
Q

Now, the bird, wasn't there, the parrot; Ron has a

parrot, doesn't he?
A

Urn-hum.

(yes)

Q

The parrot wasn't there on the 8th of May, was it?

27

(f?-

